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A State May, Consistent With the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Seek the Death
Penalty on Retrial Following a Jury Deadlock at the
First Capital-Sentencing Proceeding and Resulting
Default Sentence of Life Imprisonment: Sattazahn
v. Pennsylvania
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIFTH AMENDMENT - DOUBLE JEOPARDY -
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - The United States Supreme Court
held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did
not prevent Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty on re-
trial because neither the jury deadlock in the capital-sentencing
phase proceeding, nor the resulting entry of a default sentence of
life imprisonment, constituted an acquittal on the merits.
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
On Sunday evening, April 12, 1987, David Allen Sattazahn
("Sattazahn") and Jeffrey Hammer ("Hammer") hid and waited in
a wooded area in order to rob Boyer, the manager of the Heidel-
berg Family Restaurant.' For several weeks, Sattazahn and
Hammer had watched Boyer and determined that Sunday would
be the busiest day of the week at the restaurant. After the res-
taurant closed for the night, Sattazahn and Hammer confronted
Boyer in the parking lot.3 Boyer was carrying a bank deposit bag
containing the day's receipts as he walked through the parking
lot, and Sattazahn and Hammer tried to take the bag from Boyer
with their guns drawn.4 In response to the attempted robbery by
Sattazahn and Hammer, Boyer first threw the bank deposit bag in
the direction of the restaurant, and then he threw the bag in the
direction of the roof of the restaurant.5 Sattazahn told Boyer to
get the bank deposit bag, but Boyer refused and attempted to run.6
1. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359, 362 (Pa. 2000).
2. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 362.
3. Id.
4. Id. Sattazahn was carrying a .22 caliber Ruger semiautomatic pistol, and Hammer
was carrying a .41 caliber revolver. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
178 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 42
While running away, Boyer was shot by Sattazahn and Hammer
and fell to the ground.7 Grabbing the bank deposit bag, Sattazahn
and Hammer took flight.'
Seeking the death penalty, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
prosecuted Sattazahn and Hammer.9 At his trial on May 10, 1991,
a jury convicted Sattazahn of first-, second- and third-degree mur-
der, in addition to convictions for other charges.' ° In light of the
murder convictions, the penalty phase followed, in accordance
with Pennsylvania law.' The Commonwealth presented evidence
of one aggravating circumstance: the commission of the murder
while in the perpetration of a felony.'" As mitigating circum-
stances, Sattazahn presented his lack of a significant history of
prior criminal convictions and his age at the time of the crime."
Both sides presented their evidence, and after deliberating for
three and one-half hours, the jury returned a note, signed by the
jury foreman, stating that they were "hopelessly deadlocked at
nine (9) to three (3) for life imprisonment."' 4 Sattazahn made a
motion that the jury be discharged and the court enter a sentence
7. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 362.
8. Id.
9. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
10. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 103. At trial, Sattazahn was also found guilty of two counts
of aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of crime, carrying a firearm without a
license, and criminal conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 362. During
the course of a police investigation in 1989, Hammer made an incriminating statement as
to he and Sattazahn being accomplices in the robbery in which Boyer was killed. Com-
monwealth v. Sattazahn, 631 A.2d 597, 601 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). In return for his testi-
mony against Sattazahn, the court granted Hammer a plea bargain for third-degree mur-
der. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 364. At the time of the plea bargain, the
Commonwealth was seeking the death penalty against Hammer. Id. In light of Hammer's
criminal past, he was also facing potential jail time of 240 years, but as a result of his
guilty plea and testimony against Sattazahn, Hammer was looking at possible parole for all
of his crimes in nineteen (19) years. Id.
11. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 103. "After a verdict of murder of the first degree is re-
corded and before the jury is discharged, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing
hearing in which the jury shall determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to
death or life imprisonment." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(1) (West 2000).
12. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 103. "Aggravating circumstances must be proved by the
Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt," while "mitigating circumstances must be
proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§9711(c)(iii) (West 2000). "Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: ...
(6) The defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony." 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(6) (West 2000).
13. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 104. "Mitigating circumstances shall include the following:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convictions ... (4) The age of
the defendant at the time of the crime." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(1), (4) (West
2000).
14. Sattazahn. 537 U.S. at 104.
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of life imprisonment.'5 The judge discharged the jury and entered
a life sentence as required by Pennsylvania law.'6
The Pennsylvania Superior Court determined, on Sattazahn's
appeal, that the trial judge had erred in instructing the jury as to
various offenses that Sattazahn had been charged with, including
first-degree murder.17 Sattazahn's first-degree murder conviction
was reversed and remanded for a new trial by the Pennsylvania
Superior Court.'8 Pennsylvania filed a notice of intent to seek the
death penalty, which included both the aggravating circumstance
advocated in the first sentencing hearing, and a second, additional
aggravating circumstance.' The second aggravating circumstance
was Sattazahn's "significant history of felony convictions involving
the use or threat of violence to the person." 0 These felony convic-
tions were based on guilty pleas entered by Sattazahn, after the
first trial, to "a murder, multiple burglaries, and a robbery.""
In preparation for the retrial, Sattazahn entered a motion to
prevent Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty and adding
the second aggravating circumstance.22 The trial court denied Sat-
tazahn's motion, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
trial court's denial,23 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allo-
catur,4 and the second trial ensued.25
15. Id. Sattazahn made his motion under 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(v). Id.
Subparagraphs (iv) and (v) of §9711(c) read as follows:
(iv) the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one
aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance
or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which out-
weigh any mitigating circumstances. The verdict must be a sentence of life impris-
onment in all other cases. (v) the court may, in its discretion, discharge the jury if it
is of the opinion that further deliberation will not result in a unanimous agreement
as to the sentence, in which case the court shall sentence the defendant to life im-
prisonment.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv), (v) (West 2000).
16. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 104-05.
17. Id. at 105.
18. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 631 A.2d 597 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).
19. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 105.
20. Id. "Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: ... (9) The defen-
dant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to
the person." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(9) (West 2000).
21. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 105.
22. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 362.
23. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 679 A.2d 257 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
24. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 690 A.2d 1162 (Pa. 1997). The term allocatur (in
Latin meaning "it is allowed") is used in Pennsylvania to denote permission to appeal.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (7th ed. 1999).
25. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 105.
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Sattazahn was again convicted of first-degree murder; however,
the jury "this time imposed a sentence of death."26 In accordance
with Pennsylvania law, Sattazahn's sentence of death was directly
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which upheld the
first-degree murder conviction and the death sentence.27 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that Pennsylvania was
not barred from seeking the death penalty at Sattazahn's retrial
by either the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Due Process Clause
of the United States Constitution.28 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari." The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and
upheld Sattazahn's first-degree murder conviction and the sen-
tence of death he received in the second trial.
The Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred Pennsylvania
from seeking the death penalty against Sattazahn on retrial.1  In
addition, the Court considered whether the subsequent death sen-
tence deprived Sattazahn of his life and liberty interests under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and consequently amounted to a viola-
tion of his due process rights." The Court held that neither the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, nor the Four-
26. Id.
27. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 369. In Pennsylvania, a
sentence of death is automatically and directly appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in accordance with 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h)(1-4), which reads as follows:
(1) A sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania pursuant to its rules. (2) In addition to its authority to correct errors at
trial, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the sentence of death or vacate the sen-
tence of death and remand for further proceedings as provided in paragraph (4). (3)
The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that: (i)
the sentence of death was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary fac-
tor; or (ii) the evidence fails to support the finding of at least one aggravating cir-
cumstance specified in subsection (d). (4) If the Supreme Court determines that the
death penalty must be vacated because none of the aggravating circumstances are
supported by sufficient evidence, then it shall remand for the imposition of a life im-
prisonment sentence. If the Supreme Court determines that the death penalty must
be vacated for any other reason, it shall remand for a new sentencing hearing pursu-
ant to subsections (a) through (g).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h)(1-4) (West 2000).
28. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 105.
29. Id. See also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 535 U.S. 926 (2002). "An extraordinary
writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion, directing a lower court to deliver the
record in a case for review. The United States Supreme Court uses certiorari to review
most of the cases that it decides to hear." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 220 (7th ed. 1999).
30. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 116.
31. Id. at 106.
32. Id. at 115.
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teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, barred Pennsylvania
from seeking the death penalty against Sattazahn on retrial.33
Under the line of cases extending from Bullington v. Missouri,34
the majority found that the "touchstone for double jeopardy pro-
tection in capital-sentencing proceedings is whether there has
been an acquittal."" The Court determined that a deadlocked sen-
tencing phase jury, which has made no findings as to the alleged
aggravating circumstance, does not fairly represent an acquittal."
It was further determined by the Court that the default entry of a
life sentence by a judge, lacking discretion to fashion a sentence
following a deadlocked sentencing phase jury, does not amount to
an acquittal.37
Extending the reach of Apprendi v. New Jersey," three members
of the majority found that first degree murder is a lesser included
offense of the greater offense of first-degree murder plus at least
one aggravating circumstance.39 The Court found that neither the
judge nor the jury acquitted Sattazahn of the greater offense of
first-degree murder plus aggravating circumstance(s). ° As such,
Justice Scalia concluded that Sattazahn's appeal and successful
invalidation of his conviction of the lesser offense did not repre-
sent a double-jeopardy bar to Pennsylvania retrying him on both
the lesser and greater offenses."
33. Id. at 116.
34. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
35. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 109.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 110. "A default judgment does not trigger a double jeopardy bar to the death
penalty upon retrial." Id. at 738-39. (citing Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 367,
which quotes Commonwealth v. Martorano, 634 A.2d 1063, 1070 (Pa. 1993)).
Instructions to jury. (1) Before the jury retires to consider the sentencing verdict, the
court shall instruct the jury on the following matters: ... (v) the court may, in its dis-
cretion, discharge the jury if it is of the opinion that further deliberation will not re-
sult in a unanimous agreement as to the sentence, in which case the court shall sen-
tence the defendant to life imprisonment.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(v) (West 2000).
38. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
39. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 111-12. In part III of his opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, declared that the central issue in analyzing a
capital-sentencing proceeding for violation of Double Jeopardy focuses on the separate
offense analysis set forth in Apprendi, rather than an examination of whether the capital-
sentencing phase proceeding had the "hallmarks" of a trial, which was the basis for the
Court's holding in Bullington. See id. at 107, 111-12.
40. Id. at 113.
41. Id. (citing, for comparison: Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957) (citing




Sattazahn also argued that the subsequent death sentence in
the retrial deprived him of his life and liberty interests under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore, the second sentencing
proceeding amounted to a violation of his due process rights.4' The
Court did not find Sattazahn's argument to be persuasive, holding
that there was nothing in Pennsylvania law that would indicate
that the life sentence in the first trial somehow afforded him any
immutable life and liberty interests.43 The Court also rejected the
argument that the Pennsylvania Legislature created an "entitle-
ment" to the life sentence by requiring the court to enter a life
sentence following a hung jury at the capital-sentencing phase,
holding that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had already con-
cluded that the statute embodied no such legislative intent.44
Regardless, the court determined that if Sattazahn had been de-
prived of such an interest, it was "only by operation of the process
that he himself had invoked to invalidate the underlying first-
degree murder conviction on which it was based."5 Sattazahn's
due process claim was deemed by the Court to be "nothing more
than his double-jeopardy claim in different clothing. '
Justice O'Connor concurred in part and concurred in the judg-
ment of the majority.47 Justice O'Connor did not agree with the
Court's extension of the reach of Apprendi with regard to first de-
gree murder being a lesser included offense of the greater offense
of first-degree murder plus at least one aggravating circum-
stance." According to Justice O'Connor's opinion, it was enough
to resolve Sattazahn's double jeopardy claim solely under Bulling-
42. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 115.
43. Id. at 115-16.
44. Id. at 110.
45. Id. at 116.
46. Id. Justice Scalia stated:
The Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of criminal procedure, and
the expansion of those constitutional guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the
Due Process Clause invites undue interference with both considered legislative
judgments and the careful balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and
order.
Id. (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992)).
47. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 116 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice O'Connor joined in Parts I, II, IV, and V, but did not join in Part III of the Court's
opinion. Id.
48. Id. at 116-17 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor stated: "It remains my view that Apprendi's rule that any fact that increases the
maximum penalty must be treated as an element of the crime is not required by the Consti-
tution, by history, or by our prior cases." Id. at 117 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 619).
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ton49 and its progeny." Justice O'Connor determined that the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution was not violated by "a retrial to determine
whether death was the appropriate punishment for his [Satta-
zahn's] offenses" because he was "neither acquitted nor convicted
of the death penalty in the first trial."5'
Justice Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion which was
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer." Justice Ginsburg
would have held that "the Double Jeopardy Clause barred Penn-
sylvania from seeking the death penalty in the retrial" in light of
the trial court entering a final judgment of life imprisonment for
Sattazahn in the first trial.53 Relying on United States v. Scott54 as
to the termination of a trial, Justice Ginsburg determined that
"[a]fter the jury deadlocked at the sentencing stage, no mistrial
was declared" because Pennsylvania law provided for termination
of the proceedings "then and there in Sattazahn's favor" with the
rendering of a life sentence.55 Pennsylvania could not then "re-try
the sentencing issue at will," and completion of the initial proceed-
ing was not rendered impossible by the hung jury, as the judge
was required by Pennsylvania law to conclude the proceeding by
entering a final judgement of life imprisonment.56 The dissent also
considered that: (a) the Court's present holding would place a de-
fendant in the perilous position of risking a subsequent sentence
of death if the defendant were to appeal his original first-degree
murder conviction and sentence of life imprisonment; and (b) the
death penalty, being "unique in both its severity and its finality,"57
serves to increase a defendant's "double jeopardy interest" with
regard to precluding a subsequent prosecution. 8
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides United States citizens the
right to be free from being twice put in jeopardy for the same of-
49. Bullington, 451 U.S. 430. See supra note 34.
50. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 117 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
51. Id. at 118 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
52. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 119 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
55. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 122 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(v)). See
supra note 15.
57. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 127 (citing Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998)).
58. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 126-27.
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fense.59 In 1896, the United States Supreme Court decided United
States v. Ball, which addressed the issue of whether a double
jeopardy bar is raised by retrying a defendant on the same or an-
other indictment for the same offense, when a previous judgment
against the defendant for the same offense was set aside." In the
first trial, two of the three defendants were convicted of murder
and sentenced to death, while the other defendant was acquitted
of the murder charge and discharged.62 The convicted defendants
appealed their murder convictions, claiming that the indictment
was flawed.63 Holding that the indictment was fatally defective,
the Court reversed the judgments against the two convicted de-
fendants and remanded the case for further proceedings.64 On re-
mand, a grand jury returned an indictment of murder against all
three defendants. 5 The previously acquitted defendant filed a
plea of "former jeopardy and former acquittal."66 The previously
convicted defendants filed a plea of former jeopardy by reason of
their former trial and conviction, and by reason of the dismissal of
the original indictment.
As to the previously acquitted defendant ("M. F. Ball"), the ma-
jority held that upon completion of the first trial, he was dis-
charged due to his jury acquittal, and not because of a flaw or fail-
ing in the original indictment.6 8 The Court further held that the
reversal against the other convicted defendants, due to a flawed
indictment, could not undermine the legitimate effect of the ac-
59. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment's grant of protection reads as fol-
lows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public dan-
ger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
61. Ball, 163 U.S. at 672.
62. Id. at 670. In the first trial, John C. Ball and Robert E. Boutwell were convicted
and sentenced to death for the murder of William T. Box ("Box") in the Chickasaw Nation,
in Indian Territory. Id. at 663-64. The other defendant, Millard Fillmore Ball, was found
not guilty of the murder of Box. Id.
63. Id. at 664.
64. Id. at 664-65. The original indictment was held to be fatally flawed for not alleging
where or when the victim died. Id. at 664.
65. Id. at 665.
66. Ball, 163 U.S. at 665.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 670.
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quittal that the jury had awarded M. F. Ball.69 The Court held
that the verdict of acquittal was final, and the Constitutional pro-
hibition against a defendant being placed twice in jeopardy pre-
cluded review of such acquittal for any reason, including error.7 0
M. F. Ball's conviction in the second trial was accordingly re-
versed, and judgment was rendered for him upon his plea of for-
mer acquittal.7'
Regarding the previously convicted defendants in Ball, the ma-
jority held that the reversal of their previous conviction did not
raise a double jeopardy bar relative to a new trial on the same of-
fense.7' The subsequent murder convictions and sentences of
death for the two previously convicted defendants were affirmed
by the Court.73
In 1919, the United States Supreme Court in Stroud v. United
States74 addressed the issue of whether a defendant, initially con-
victed of murder and given a life sentence, could be given the
death penalty upon retrial for the same offense and conviction of
murder.75 The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Constitution does not bar a subsequent murder conviction and
sentence of death at retrial when a reversal of a murder conviction
and sentence of life imprisonment in a previous trial were ob-
tained by means of writs of error sued out by the defendant him-
self.76
In the first of three murder trials, Stroud was convicted of mur-
dering a guard in the United States prison at Leavenworth, Kan-
sas, and sentenced to death by hanging.7 Upon confession of error
by the U.S. District Attorney, Stroud's first murder conviction was
reversed and a second trial was held." In the second trial, Stroud
was again convicted of murder, but this time, he was given a sen-
tence of life imprisonment. 79 "Upon writ of error to [the Court] the
Solicitor General of the United States confessed error," and the
69. Id.
70. Id. at 671.
71. Ball, 163 U.S. at 671.
72. Id. at 671-72. The Court stated that "a defendant who procures a judgment against
him upon an indictment to be set aside may be tried upon the same indictment, or upon
another indictment, for the same offense of which he had been previously convicted." Id.
73. Id. at 674.
74. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
75. Stroud, 251 U.S. at 16-17.
76. Id. at 18.





second murder conviction was accordingly reversed."0 At the com-
pletion of the third trial, Stroud was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death."s
The Court also held that while a jury may mitigate the punish-
ment for a murder conviction to life imprisonment by means of
adding the words "without capital punishment" to the verdict (as
the jury did in Stroud's second trial), such mitigation does not re-
duce the conviction to anything less than first degree murder.s2 In
Stroud's third trial, the judge particularly called the jury's atten-
tion to the statutory provision allowing them the option of adding
the words "without capital punishment" to the verdict." As such,
a life sentence imposed in connection with a prior murder convic-
tion did not raise a double jeopardy bar relative to the imposition
of a death sentence upon retrial for the same offense.84
Fifty years after Stroud, the Court in North Carolina v. Pearce5
considered the extent to which the Double Jeopardy Clause pre-
cludes a harsher sentence after a subsequent conviction in a re-
trial, when the earlier conviction was set aside as the result of
some process invoked by the defendant himself.86 Justice Stewart,
relying on Ball, Stroud and their progeny, held that when, at the
defendant's behest, an original conviction has been set aside and
wholly nullified (in effect wiping the slate clean), the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause does not restrict the general power of a judge to im-
pose a longer prison sentence in the subsequent conviction than
originally received by defendant. 7
In Pearce, the Court considered the appeals of two defendants
whose original convictions were each reversed upon post-
conviction proceedings, and followed by retrials in which each de-
80. Stroud, 251 U.S. at 16-17. A writ of error is "[a] writ issued by an appellate court
directing a lower court to deliver the record in the case for review." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1604 (7th ed. 1999). Confessing error is defined as [a] plea admitting to an
assignment of error." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 293 (7th ed. 1999). An assignment of error
is defined as "[a] specification of the trial court's alleged errors on which the appellant
relies in seeking an appellate court's reversal, vacation, or modification of an adverse
judgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 116 (7th ed. 1999).
81. Stroud, 251 U.S. at 16-17.
82. Id. Adding the words "without capital punishment" to a murder conviction results
in the convicted person being sentenced to imprisonment for life. Id. at 18. In the absence
of the words "without capital punishment... the court can do no less than inflict the death
penalty." Id.
83. Id. at 18.
84. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 106 (citing Stroud, 251 U.S. at 15).
85. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
86. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 713.
87. Id. at 719-21.
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fendant was again convicted but received a longer sentence.
8
Pearce was twice convicted of assault with intent to commit rape
and sentenced to twelve to fifteen years in his first trial; he re-
ceived what amounted to an extension of his prison term in the
second trial. 89  Rice, the other appellant, pleaded guilty to four
separate second-degree burglary charges in his first trial and was
sentenced to prison terms amounting to a total of ten years.90
Upon retrial, Rice was convicted of three of the charges and re-
ceived prison terms aggregating twenty-five years."
The Court in Pearce held that the power of the state to retry a
defendant who's first conviction was set aside is in no way limited
by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.9" Justice
Stewart further opined that a defendant whose conviction is set
aside due to a procedural error may be retried and convicted by
the state, and that such a retrial and conviction derives from "a
well-established part of our constitutional jurisprudence."93 Fi-
nally, the Court determined that, in addition to the state's power
to retry a defendant, the state also has a corresponding power to
impose any legally authorized subsequent sentence regardless of
whether the subsequent sentence is greater than the previous sen-
tence, provided that a subsequent conviction is obtained.94  The
Court in Pearce reasoned that to hold otherwise would cast doubt
upon the principle enunciated in Ball and its progeny."
In 1989, the Supreme Court refused to extend the rationale of
Pearce to what the Court deemed to be the very different facts of
Bullington v. Missouri.96 In Bullington, the defendant was con-
victed of capital murder, and after a separate presentencing hear-
ing, was sentenced by the jury to life imprisonment, to be served
for a minimum of 50 years prior to being eligible for probation or
88. Id. at 712-15.
89. Id. at 713. Pearce was tried and retried in North Carolina, and appealed his second
conviction and sentence up through the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of North Carolina and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, from
which the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 713-14.
90. Id. at 714.
91. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 714. Rice's trial and retrial were held in Alabama. Id. at 714-
15. Rice appealed his second conviction and sentence up through the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, from which the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 715.
92. Id. at 719-20.
93. Id. at 720 (citing United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 721.
96. 451 U.S. 430, 445 (1981).
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parole.97 Upon his post-trial motion, the defendant was granted a
new trial, and the prosecution provided notice that it again would
seek the death penalty on the same aggravating circumstances it
had sought to prove at the first trial.9 Bullington filed a motion
(based on double jeopardy grounds) to prevent the prosecution
from again seeking the death penalty on the same aggravating
circumstances.99 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether the prosecution's pursuit of the death penalty in the
retrial represented a violation of Bullington's rights under the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.1 0
In previous cases such as Ball, Stroud and Pearce, the Court
had resisted attempts to extend to sentencing the principle that
an acquittal raises a double jeopardy bar to the imposition of a
more severe sentence upon retrial." Justice Blackmun, who de-
livered the opinion of the Court, distinguished Bullington from
these prior cases, noting that a jury has limited discretion with
regard to selecting an appropriate punishment from a wide range
of statutory options.' In Bullington's trial, the sentencing proce-
dures had the hallmarks of a trial on guilt or innocence, in that
the prosecution was required to prove additional facts, such as one
or more aggravating circumstances, beyond a reasonable doubt.
0 3
Given that an acquittal on the issue of guilt or innocence is fi-
nal, the Court further reasoned that such a principle
correspondingly applies to a jury's rejection of the state's argu-
ment for the death penalty.0 4 In light of such considerations, the
majority held that when the sentencing proceeding has the hall-
marks of a trial with regard to the question of guilt or innocence,
the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to a defen-
97. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 430.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 437.
101. Id. at 437-38.
102. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 438.
103. Id. at 439.
104. Id. at 445. The Court stated:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American sys-
tem of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibil-
ity that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Id. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)).
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dant who is acquitted by a jury is also available to such defendant
with respect to the imposition of the death penalty upon retrial.
1 5
Deeming the majority's opinion in Bullington to be irreconcil-
able with the precedents of the Court, Justice Powell dissented."6
Relying on Stroud and Pearce, Justice Powell argued that while
the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to subsequent determinations
of guilt or innocence, it does not similarly apply to sentencing de-
cisions after a retrial.07 Justice Powell found the majority's justi-
fication for applying an implicit-acquittal principle to sentencing
wholly unpersuasive' ° In contrast to determinations as to guilt
or innocence, Justice Powell argued that the law provides only
limited standards for assessing the validity of a sentencing deci-
sion."9 In further support of his position, Justice Powell argued
that under the Double Jeopardy Clause the possibility of a higher
sentence is acceptable (whereas the possibility of error as to guilt
or innocence is not) because the sentencing decision of the second
jury is as correct as that of the first jury."0
In 1984, the Court extended the rule of Bullington to Arizona v.
Rumsey,"' a similar case in which a trial judge (rather than a
jury) sat as the sentencer in the sentencing proceeding of a defen-
dant convicted of first-degree murder."' Denis Wayne Rumsey
("Rumsey") was convicted of first degree murder and armed rob-
bery by an Arizona jury."3 The trial judge, in accordance with
Arizona statutory sentencing requirements, imposed sentence
without the assistance of a jury.114 The trial judge determined that
there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and
entered a statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment,
without possibility of parole for twenty-five years."5 Rumsey ap-
pealed the imposition of consecutive sentences for his robbery and
105. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 446.
106. Id. at 447. Justice Powell was joined in the dissent by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
White and Justice Rehnquist. Id.
107. Id. at 447.
108. Id. at 451.
109. Id. at 450.
110. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 451.
111. 467 U.S. 203 (1984).
112. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 211. In Bullington, see supra note 95, the jury sat as the sen-
tencer in the sentencing proceeding relative to Bullington's first-degree murder conviction.
Id. at 209.
113. Id. at 205.
114. Id. at 205-06.
115. Id. Rumsey was also sentenced to a 21-year prison term for armed robbery. Id. at




murder convictions, which allowed the state of Arizona to cross-
appeal the life sentence.'16 The Arizona Supreme Court rejected
Rumsey's arguments as to his consecutive sentences, but re-
manded the case for resentencing of the murder conviction due to
an error of interpretation by the trial court as to an aggravating
circumstance."7 On remand, the trial court imposed the death
penalty at the completion of a new sentencing hearing, which
Rumsey argued was in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause
and the rule in Bullington."8 Rumsey's mandatory appeal to the
Supreme Court of Arizona resulted in his sentence being reduced
from death to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for
twenty-five years."9 The State of Arizona filed for a writ of certio-
rari, which the United States Supreme Court granted.'2 ° The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgement of the Su-
preme Court of Arizona, and Rumsey's life sentence was main-
tained. 2'
In Rumsey, Justice O'Connor, who delivered the opinion of the
Court, determined that the sentencer being the trial judge rather
than the jury did not render the sentencing proceeding any less
like a trial.'22 For purposes of comparison, Justice O'Connor iden-
tified three elements of the sentencing proceeding in Bullington
that made it comparable to a trial for double jeopardy purposes: (i)
the discretion of the sentencer (the jury in Bullington) is limited to
only two options: death or life imprisonment without possibility of
parole for fifty years; (ii) the sentencer makes its decision guided
by substantive standards and based on evidence introduced in a
separate proceeding that formally resembles a trial; and (iii) the
prosecution has to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, certain
statutorily defined facts to support a sentence of death.'23 Aside
from the sentencer being the trial judge, three substantially
equivalent elements were deemed by the Court to be present in
the capital sentencing proceeding employed by the state of Arizona
in Rumsey.'24 The fact that the sentencer was a trial judge, rather
than a jury, was held to be of no consequence by the Court because
116. Id. at 206-07.
117. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 207.
118. Id. at 207-08.
119. Id. at 208-09.
120. Id. at 209.
121. Id. at 213.
122. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 210.
123. Id. at 209.
124. Id. at 209-10.
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double jeopardy jurisprudence treats bench and jury trials alike.'
25
As such, the capital sentencing proceedings of Missouri (as seen in
Bullington), and of Arizona (as seen in Rumsey), were held by the
Court to be indistinguishable for double jeopardy purposes.2 6 It
was further held by the Court that an acquittal on the merits bars
retrial, even if it is based on legal error.1 2 7
Two years later, in Poland v. Arizona,'28 the Court addressed the
issue of whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a further
capital sentencing proceeding when, upon appeal of a death sen-
tence, the appellate court determines that the evidence was: (i)
insufficient to support the only aggravating circumstance relied
upon by the trial court; and (ii) sufficient to support a sentence of
death.'29 In distinguishing Poland from Bullington and Rumsey,
the Court determined that the "clean slate" rule of Pearce was ap-
plicable and ruled that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not fore-
close a second sentencing hearing."o
In Poland, Patrick and Michael Poland (hereinafter "the Po-
lands") had robbed a Purolator van and killed the two Purolator
guards by dumping them in a lake in sacks weighted with rocks.''
In the first trial, the jury convicted the Polands of first-degree
murder, and the trial judge, sitting as sentencer in a separate pro-
ceeding, sentenced the Polands to death based on evidence pro-
vided in support of the aggravating circumstance of committing
the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.
32
In light of his statutory interpretation, the trial judge determined
that the additional aggravating circumstance of committing the
offense as consideration for the receipt of, or in the expectation of
the receipt of pecuniary gain was not applicable.'33 On appeal of
their death sentences, the Arizona Supreme Court determined
that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of the espe-
cially heinous, cruel, or depraved aggravating circumstance, but
that the trial judge committed legal error by not relying on the
aggravating circumstance of committing the offense for receipt of
125. Id. at 210 (citing United States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1, 3 (1976)).
126. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 210.
127. Id. at 211.
128. 476 U.S. 147 (1986).
129. Poland, 476 U.S. at 148.
130. Id. at 152, 154, 156-57.
131. Id. at 148.




pecuniary gain.' The Arizona Supreme Court further held that if
the defendants were again convicted of first-degree murder upon
retrial, the trial court may find the existence of the pecuniary gain
to be an aggravating circumstance.'35 On remand, the Polands
were again convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death.3 6 The trial judge, in delivering the subsequent sentence of
death, found that both the pecuniary gain and the especially hei-
nous, cruel, or depraved aggravating circumstances, as alleged by
the prosecution, were applicable.'37
On appeal of the second death sentence, the United States Su-
preme Court distinguished Poland from Rumsey in that, unlike
the trial judge in Poland, the trial judge in Rumsey did not find
any aggravating circumstances and entered a sentence of life im-
prisonment.' Relying on both Bullington and Rumsey, the Court
determined that the relevant inquiry in Poland was whether the
trial judge or the reviewing court, sitting as sentencer, had found
that the prosecution did not prove its case for the death penalty,
and in effect acquitted the Polands.'3 9 Justice White, who deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court, found that at no point did either the
sentencer (trial judge) or the reviewing court hold that the prose-
cution had failed to prove its case as to whether the Polands de-
served the death penalty.'4 ° In addition, Justice White stated that
under Bullington, "the proper inquiry is whether the sentencer or
reviewing court has 'decided that the prosecution has not proved
134. Poland, 476 U.S. at 149-50. The Arizona Supreme Court explained that the offense
commissioned for receipt of pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance is not limited to
situations involving contract killings. Id.
135. Id. at 150.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 153-54. As in Poland, the trial judge in Rumsey made the same error of in-
terpretation as to the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance. Id.
139. Poland, 476 U.S. at 154.
140. Id. Commenting more particularly on the lack of acquittal by either the sentencing
judge or the reviewing court, Justice White in Poland stated:
Plainly, the sentencing judge did not acquit, for he imposed the death penalty. While
the Arizona Supreme Court held that the sentencing judge erred in relying on the
"especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating circumstance, it did not hold that
the prosecution had failed to prove its case for the death penalty. Indeed, the court
clearly indicated that there had been no such failure by remarking that "the trial
court mistook the law when it did not find that the defendants 'committed the offense
as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecu-
niary value,' " and that upon retrial, if the defendants are again convicted of first de-




its case' that the death penalty is appropriate.""' The Court was
not prepared to extend Bullington further to include a capital sen-
tencing hearing, such that it would be viewed as a set of mini-
trials relative to the existence of each aggravating circumstance.
1 42
In conclusion, Justice White held that because there was no ac-
quittal of the death penalty, the clean slate rule applied, and the
Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the second capital sentencing
hearing.
4 3
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, argued that there was no dif-
ference between Poland and Rumsey.14 Justice White deemed the
fact that the Polands did not receive life sentences inconsequential
for purposes of distinguishing Poland from Rumsey.1 4 5 The dissent
pointed out that in Rumsey, an acquittal on the merits was
deemed to have been reached when the life sentence was imposed
based on the lack of a finding of any aggravating circumstances,
despite the fact that the conclusion was based on an error of law. 141
Because the reversal of the death sentence in Poland was likewise
predicated on an error of law, Justice Marshall argued that in
light of Rumsey, such a reversal should also have the effect of an
acquittal on the merits, and as such the Double Jeopardy Clause
should bar the State of Arizona from again seeking the death pen-
alty against the Polands. 47 Justice Marshall also found it imper-
missible to remand the case for further fact finding relative to the
possibility of proving the existence of other aggravating circum-
stances. 148
In 2000, the United States Supreme Court, in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, addressed the question of what constitutes an element of
an offense for purposes of the jury-trial guarantee under the Sixth
141. Id. at 155 (emphasis in original).
142. Id. at 156. Aggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses, but
are "standards to guide the making of [the] choice" between the alternative verdicts of
death and life imprisonment. Id.
143. Id. at 157.
144. Poland, 476 U.S. at 157 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall was joined by
Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun in the single dissenting opinion of Poland. Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 158 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 159-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 160-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "In no other circumstance would the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause countenance the offer of a second chance to the State and the trial




Amendment of the United States Constitution.19 In Apprendi, the
Court ruled that aside from the existence of a prior conviction, one
or more facts that result in a penalty being increased beyond the
minimum set by statute must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt before a jury."' Such a penalty-increasing fact was deemed
by the Court to constitute an element of the offense.'
In December of 1994, Apprendi had fired several bullets into the
home of an African-American family located in what had previ-
ously been an all-white neighborhood.' Pursuant to a guilty plea,
Apprendi was convicted of second-degree possession of a firearm
for an unlawful purpose and unlawful possession of a prohibited
weapon.' The trial judge extended Apprendi's sentence under
New Jersey's hate crime statute, which allowed for such an exten-
sion upon the judge's finding by a preponderance of the evidence
that a defendant acted for purposes of intimidating his victim
based on the victim's particular characteristics. The Court held
that it was unconstitutional for the state legislature of New Jersey
to prevent a jury from assessing facts that may increase a criminal
defendant's penalty."5  The Court further held that "such facts
must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."5 '
More recently, the Court in Ring v. Arizona"7 addressed the is-
sue of whether the Sixth Amendment requires a jury, rather than
a judge, to determine the existence of any aggravating circum-
stances for purposes of imposing the death penalty in a capital
sentencing proceeding."' The Court ruled that since Arizona's
enumerated aggravating factors operate as "the functional equiva-
149. 530 U.S. 466 at 469, 476 (2000). The Sixth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution reads as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The Court also considered the importance of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466-67, 469.
150. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
151. Id. at 482-83.
152. Id. at 469.
153. Id. at 469-70.
154. Id. at 471-72.
155. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
156. Id.
157. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
158. Ring, 536 U.S. at 588.
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lent of an element of a greater offense"'59 (i.e., murder plus one or
more aggravating circumstances), such aggravating factors must
be found, not by a judge sitting alone as sentencer, but rather by a
jury is accordance with the Sixth Amendment.'
60
Timothy Ring ("Ring") was convicted by an Arizona jury of fel-
ony murder for the killing of an armored car guard in the course of
robbing an armored car. 6' In accordance with Arizona law, the
trial judge sitting alone could sentence Ring to death if further
findings were made in the course of the sentencing hearing.'62 At
Ring's sentencing hearing, which was held before the trial judge in
the absence of a jury, another suspect (Greenham) testified that
Ring had planned the robbery in advance and was the one who
actually shot and killed the armored car guard.63  In light of
Greenham's testimony, and following a separate sentencing pro-
ceeding in which the trial judge made determinations as to aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances, the trial judge entered a
special verdict sentencing Ring to death. 6" Ring appealed his
death sentence, arguing that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution were violated by Ari-
zona's capital sentencing scheme because it placed the responsibil-
ity for finding a fact that could increase the defendant's maximum
penalty from a sentence of life in prison to a sentence of death in
the judge.165
The Court reasoned that a defendant's right to a jury trial,
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, would be "senselessly di-
minished if it were held to encompass the fact-finding necessary to
increase a defendant's sentence by two years," as held in Ap-
prendi, but at the same time "not to [encompass] the fact-finding
necessary to sentence a defendant to death," as held in Walton.66
In light of Apprendi, the Court reversed Ring's death sentence,
159. Id. at 609 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494).
160. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. The Court in Ring overruled Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639 (1990), which held that "Arizona's capital sentencing scheme [allowing a judge to sit
alone as sentencer] was compatible with the Sixth Amendment because the additional facts
found by the judge qualified as sentencing considerations, rather than elements of the of-
fense of capital murder." Id. at 588 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 591-92.
162. Id. at 592.
163. Id. at 593. Greenham testified against Ring and another suspect (Ferguson) as part
of a plea bargain in which Greenham pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. Id.
164. Id. at 594-95.
165. Ring, 536 U.S. at 595. The Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee is made appli-
cable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 597.
166. Id. at 609. See supra note 157.
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and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with
their opinion. '67 The Court in Ring overruled Walton in light of
Apprendi.6 8
In her dissent in Ring, Justice O'Connor stated that she would
overrule Apprendi rather than Walton.'69 Justice O'Connor argued
in Ring, as she did in her dissent in Apprendi, that a rule requir-
ing "any fact that increases the maximum penalty [to be] treated
as an element of the crime is not required by the Constitution, by
history, or by the Court's prior cases." ' ° Such a rule, the dissent
found, ignores the nation's significant history of discretionary sen-
tencing by judges. 7' Justice O'Connor further argued that the ex-
tension of the rule in Apprendi to situations such as Ring would
have a destabilizing effect on the criminal justice system, as it
would result in the capital sentencing schemes of five states being
declared unconstitutional, and those of another four states being
cast into doubt, resulting in a flood of death sentence challenges.'
Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution commands that no State shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'73 Sattazahn
advanced a second argument that, in addition to violating the
Double Jeopardy Clause, his second capital-sentencing proceeding
167. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
168. Id. Justice Ginsburg stated: "[W]e hold that Walton and Apprendi are irreconcil-
able; our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence cannot be home to both. Accordingly, we over-
rule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an
aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty." Id.
169. Id. at 619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor was joined in her dissent by
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
172. Ring, 536 U.S. at 620-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The states whose capital sen-
tencing schemes are declared unconstitutional in light of Ring are Colorado, Idaho, Mon-
tana, Nebraska and Arizona. Id. at 620 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "There are 168 prison-
ers on death row in these states." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The states whose capital
sentencing schemes are rendered doubtful in light of Ring are Alabama, Delaware, Florida
and Indiana (as these states have hybrid capital sentencing schemes). Id. at 621
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). "There are 629 prisoners on death row in these states." Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
173. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 115. Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment reads as
follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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served to deprive him of his due process rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 74  Citing Medina v. California,' the Court
determined that Sattazahn's "due-process claim [was] nothing
more than his double-jeopardy claim in different clothing."
7 6
In Medina, the Court addressed the question of whether a Cali-
fornia statute, which placed the burden on the defendant to prove
his own incompetence to stand trial for murder, represented a vio-
lation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
7
Prior to Medina's murder trial, he was granted a competency hear-
ing, which was conducted, in accordance with California state law,
under a presumption of competence, with the defendant bearing
the burden of showing incompetence by a preponderance of the
evidence. 7  Medina was found by a jury to be competent to stand
trial, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death.
79
Medina argued that the imposition of such a burden upon him by
the California statute represented a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'80
The Court rejected Medina's argument based on their determi-
nation that California's procedure was constitutionally adequate
to guard against a violation of his due process rights, or more spe-
cifically, to guard against the criminal trial of an incompetent per-
son.' Speaking more broadly, the Court further held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has tradition-
ally required that only the most basic procedural safeguards be
observed, and that a "more subtle balancing of society's interests
against those of the accused [have] been better left to the legisla-
tive branch."'82 Medina's due process challenge was rejected by
174. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 115.
175. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
176. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 116. (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992)). The
Court stated in Medina:
The Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of criminal procedure, and
the expansion of those constitutional guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the
Due Process Clause invites undue interference with both considered legislative
judgments and the careful balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and
order.
Medina, 505 U.S. at 443.
177. Medina, 505 U.S. at 439.
178. Id. at 440.
179. Id. at 441
180. Id. at 442-43.
181. Id. at 453.
182. Medina, 505 U.S. at 453
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the Court, and his murder conviction and sentence of death were
affirmed."3
Under Bullington, the protection provided by the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause of the United States Constitution is available to pro-
tect a defendant from the imposition of the death penalty upon
retrial when the defendant has been acquitted of a death sentence
in the prior capital-sentencing proceeding, provided that the capi-
tal-sentencing proceeding bears all of the hallmarks of a trial with
regard to the question of guilt and innocence." A capital sentence
hearing is deemed to bear the hallmarks of a trial if: (i) the discre-
tion of the sentencer is limited, e.g., to a choice between only death
or life imprisonment; (ii) the sentencer makes its decision based on
evidence introduced in a separate proceeding that resembles a
trial; and (iii) in support of a death sentence, the state must prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, facts that are prescribed by
statute. 185
Once it has been established that the sentencing hearing bears
the hallmarks of a trial, the controlling question becomes one of
determining what amounts to an acquittal of a death penalty sen-
tence for purposes of raising a double jeopardy bar which would
preclude the state from seeking the death penalty in a resentenc-
ing hearing. In light of Bullington and Rumsey, an acquittal by a
jury or a judge sitting as the sole decision-maker in the sentencing
proceeding "is final and bars retrial on the same charge.""6 In
particular, a judgment amounts to an acquittal on the merits
when it is based on findings that are sufficient to establish legal
entitlement to a sentence of life imprisonment.'87 Such a result
would bar resentencing on the question of the death penalty."", In
further describing what amounts to an acquittal, the Court in Po-
land held that a death penalty acquittal occurs when "the sen-
tencer or reviewing court has decided that the prosecution has not
proved its case that the death penalty is appropriate."'89
If it is determined that an acquittal of the death penalty on the
merits has occurred, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the state
from again seeking the death penalty upon retrial. However, if an
183. Id.
184. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 446.
185. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 209-10.
186. Id. at 211.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Poland, 476 U.S. at 155-56.
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acquittal on the merits of a death penalty is not reached, then the
clean slate rule of Pearce is applicable, and the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not afford the defendant protection from the state
again seeking the death penalty upon retrial.190
In Sattazahn's first sentencing hearing, the jury made no find-
ings as to whether the prosecution had or had not proved the al-
leged aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.' In
light of the deadlocked sentencing jury, the judge, in accordance
with Pennsylvania law, had no discretion with regard to the statu-
torily required entry of the sentence of life imprisonment.'92 Un-
der the line of cases extending from Bullington, it is clear that nei-
ther the sentencing jury nor the judge arrived at an acquittal on
the merits with regard to Sattazahn's penalty of death. As such, it
reasonably follows that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar
the State of Pennsylvania from again seeking the death penalty
against Sattazahn.
The Court's extension of Apprendi to Ring, for purposes defining
murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances as being a
separate offense from murder simpliciter, appears to be superflu-
ous with regard to holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause did
not bar Pennsylvania from again seeking the death penalty
against Sattazahn upon retrial.'93 In Sattazahn's case, the sen-
tencing jury made no decision or findings at all as to the aggravat-
ing circumstance, and the judge had no discretion with regard to
his statutorily required entry of the penalty of life imprisonment.
Bullington and its progeny have limited the reach of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, meaning that it does not bar the pursuit of a
death sentence upon retrial, in light of the facts of Sattazahn.
The Court's ruling in Sattazahn will likely have the result of
placing certain defendants in murder cases in a perilous position.
A defendant, who has received a sentence of life imprisonment as
the result of a hung sentencing jury, which is deemed not to have
provided an acquittal on the merits as to the death penalty, will
have to decide whether to accept life imprisonment, or run the risk
of receiving a death sentence upon retrial if he challenges his con-
viction. While such concerns are valid, they are not necessarily
determinative with regard to double jeopardy. The determinative
190. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721, 723.
191. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 109.
192. Id. See supra note 15, for 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(v) (West 2000).
193. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 111-12.
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issue is whether the defendant has secured an acquittal of the
death penalty on the merits. In Sattazahn, no such acquittal was
secured, and therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not rep-
resent a bar to retrial on the death penalty question.
It has been proposed that elimination of subsection (v) of Penn-
sylvania's sentencing statute (which requires a judge to enter a
sentence of life imprisonment in the case of a hung sentencing
jury) could eliminate both the harsher sentence issue and the
question of whether there has been an acquittal.1 14 However, the
elimination of subsection (v) could lead to additional problems, not
least of which would be procedural.
Even in the absence of subsection (v), a sentencing jury deciding
the question of death or life imprisonment could still become dead-
locked. Perhaps the equivalent of a mistrial as to the sentencing
phase would then be declared, in which case a resentencing hear-
ing would be held. In the absence of additional facts, a resentenc-
ing hearing before the same jury would likely again result in a
hung jury. A resentencing hearing before a new jury would hardly
seem reasonable, as the new jury would not have heard for them-
selves all of the facts of the case. '95 As such, elimination of subsec-
tion (v) of Pennsylvania's sentencing statute alone would not ap-
pear to represent a viable option with regard to addressing or oth-
erwise obviating the harsher sentence issue, and the issue of
whether an acquittal has been achieved.
James R. Franks
194. Jennifer L. Czernicki, Recent Decision, The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution does not Bar the Death Penalty Upon Retrial After the Trial Judge
Grants a Life Sentence on Behalf of a Hung Jury, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 127, 144 (2001). See
supra note 15, for 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(v) (West 2000).
195. In Pennsylvania, after delivering a verdict of murder of the first degree, the same
jury then determines whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprison-
ment, in a separate sentencing hearing. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(1) (West 2000).
Paragraph (1) of § 9711(a) reads as follows: "After a verdict of murder of the first degree is
recorded and before the jury is discharged, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing
hearing in which the jury shall determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to
death or life imprisonment." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(1) (West 2000) (emphasis
added).
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